between continuing criminal enterprise convictions, conspiracy convictions, and the Double Jeopardy Clause 10 of the Fifth Amendment. I I The potential Double Jeopardy Clause violation arises because of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, which mandates that "no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence."I 2 Given that prosecutors have broad discretion in selecting charges, 13 defendants accused of operating a continuing criminal enterprise are often charged with conspiring to violate the narcotiCs laws as well. 14 Courts then must consider whether convicting and sentencing a defendant for both CCE and conspiracy violates the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. The purposes that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine serves and the impact that multiple convictions can have upon criminal defendants both highlight the importance of the issue. Unfortunately, the federal courts have not formulated a consistent solution to the question, leaving the contours of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine in "disarray."I 5 A majority of the circuit courts of appeals hold that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within continuing criminal enterprise and vacate convictions and sentences for conspiracy in order to avoid double punishment. I 6 Conversely, four circuits have decided that retaining convictions for both CCE and conspiracy does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause, but those circuits disagree as to how to deal with the convictions and sentences. 17 This Note argues that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine prohibits the imposition of concurrent convictions and sentences upon criminal defendants found guilty of engaging in a CCE and conspiring to violate narcotics laws. Part I surveys the values underlying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine and traces the evolution of the Supreme Court's 10. " [N] or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb ...• " U.S. CoNST 13. The Supreme Court has held that the state may try a defendant for both greater-and lesser-included offenses, even though the defendant may be sentenced for only one of the crimes. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) .
14. Note concludes that the majority approach -mandating the vacation of conspiracy convictions and sentences obtained simultaneously with a CCE conviction -is the only method utilized by the courts of appeals that comports with the Multiple Punishment Doctrine.
I. THE GENESIS, EVOLUTION, AND PURPOSES OF THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT DOCTRINE
This Part reviews the historical underpinnings of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine and the manner in which the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine to modern criminal law, including continuing criminal enterprise prosecutions. Section I.A examines the origin of the multiple punishment bar and surveys the doctrine's constitutional functions, focusing on protection it provides against adverse collateral consequences. Section l.B describes the Supreme Court's test for analyzing disputes involving the potential for double punishment in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Section I.C reviews the Court's interpretation of the doctrine in cases involving CCE convictions and concludes that the Supreme Court has not formulated a coherent body of precedent for evaluating multiple punishment claims in the CCE conspiracy context.
A. The Purposes of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine
The notion that no person should be subject to criminal prosecution or punishment twice for the same offense is perhaps the oldest 18 and most widely recognized 19 guarantee in the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court describes double jeopardy as encompassing three separate protections: protection against retrial following acquittal, protection against retrial following conviction, and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. 20 The Court long ago recognized that the third protection -"that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence" 21 -was "clearly [contained within] the spirit of the [Fifth Amendment]." 22 The seminal case regarding multiple punishment, Ex parte Lange, 23 involved a claim of excessive punishment raised by a defendant sentenced to both imprisonment and a fine, even though the applicable statute authorized only one of the punishments. 24 The Court, after surveying the common law,. reasoned that the protection against multiple punishments forms the core of the Double Jeopardy Clause:
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, [a person] can never be tried again for that offence? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution. 25 The Court ordered Lange's release because he had fully satisfied one of (1953) ("for one offense, only one punishment might be inflicted"). Today, the right of a criminal defendant not to be subjected to punishment more than once for a crime is well recognized in industrialized societies. See (1965) . The argument stems from Madison's initial wording of the Clause, which provided that "[n]o person shall be subject •.. to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offence." l ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
This argument presumes that, although the wording of the Clause was altered, the meaning assigned to the Clause was not. The limited record surrounding the change in wording does not provide any definitive reason to accept or reject this notion. Representative Benson moved to amend the original wording of the Clause to ensure habeas corpus relief, arguing that the prohibition on multiple trials would prevent persons convicted unfairly from obtaining a second trial. In his estimation, " [t] he humane intention of the clause was to prevent more than one punishment." Id. at 782. The amendment was defeated by a large margin, however. Id. Representative Lawrence subsequently introduced a motion to limit the right against self-incrimination to criminal trials, which was adopted. Id. Representative Lawrence's refined wording apparently altered the phrasing of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well.
The Supreme Court has apparently accepted this reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause's historical significance. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (noting that "[i]n drafting his initial version of what came to be our Double Jeopardy Clause, James Madison focused explicitly on the issue of multiple punishment").
[Vol. 91:2220 the alternative statutory penalties. 26 In so doing, the Court recognized the Multiple Punishment Doctrine as an essential foundation of the Constitution's bulwark protecting criminal defendants from double jeopardy.
The judiciary has not interpreted the prohibition on multiple punishments consistently, however. One commentator astutely suggests that judges have conducted Double Jeopardy Clause inquiries without reference to the justifications which should inform a court's decisionmaking. 27 Such lackadaisical jurisprudence may explain why thenJustice Rehnquist noted that double jeopardy doctrine was mired in "confusion." 28 Yet, the purposes underlying a rule of law may ultimately be the most important guide in conducting the judicial inquiry in an individual case. 29 Hence, an inquiry into the constitutionality of imposing convictions and sentences for both CCE and conspiracy ought to begin with the purposes underlying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. Using these goals to analyze multiple punishment claims should yield a better decisionmaking process and a presumptively superior result.
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine serves three constitutional objectives. Initially, the doctrine limits the state's discretion to subject a citizen to punishment exceeding that condoned by the legislature by acting through the office of the prosecutor. 30 Indeed, the doctrine's significance has become more pronounced as the proliferation of statutory offenses has greatly increased the prosecutor's power over a criminal defendant. 31 several ways. The profusion of statutory crimes allows the prosecutor to choose a punishment and select a crime to fit that punishment. 32 A prosecutor might also threaten to seek convictions under a variety of overlapping statutes to coerce a defendant into accepting a plea bargain. 33 Finally, the ability to prosecute a defendant for several statutory offenses increases the probability that the prosecutor will obtain a conviction on at least one of the charges. 3 4 The importance of protection from arbitrary and oppressive prosecutorial conduct should be readily apparent: "Double jeopardy was designed to thwart government tyranny. A disgruntled prosecutor or an inflamed democracy can be just as tyrannical as a monarch."35 Judicial enforcement of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine blunts the ability of a prosecutor to utilize such discretion against a defendant. 36
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine concomitantly reinforces the constitutionally mandated demarcation of powers between the three branches of government. 37 A court can punish a defendant under multiple statutory provisions only if the legislature has authorized punishment under two or more statutes. 38 This rule reflects the legislature's exclusive authority to define criminal behavior and to establish appropriate punishments. 39 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[i]f a attorneys have been most adept in the use of of conspiracy charges to secure more ease in utilizing evidence, to avoid the statute of limitations, to obtain more and easier double convictions, and to bolster their personal reputation for diligence.").
32. Note, supra note 25, at 304-05.
33
. Id. at 305 ("Given the choice of contesting guilt and risking crushing sentence, or pleading guilty to one of the offenses, an uncertain defendant may well capitulate."). 34. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 372 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (" [W] here the prosecution's evidence is weak, its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty on one or more charges as a result of a compromise verdict."); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 867 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that prosecutorial tactic of bringing multiple charges tends to "tilt the scales of justice against the defendant"). [T] he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.") (emphasis added). For a criticism of this approach, see infra note 75.
39. See, e.g., Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368 ("Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments."). Peter Westen and Richard Drube! suggest that double jeopardy also constrains the legislature's power to fashion penalties. They argue that "the Double Jeopardy Clause acts as an indirect restraint on the legislature, because it demands a certain standard of clarity from the [Vol. 91 :2220 federal court exceeds its own authority by imposing multiple punishments not authorized by Congress, it violates . . . the constitutional principle of separation of powers. " 40 The importance of maintaining strict boundaries between the powers of the three branches of government in our democracy is undisputed. 41 Violation of the separation of powers in the criminal justice context uniquely corrodes our system of republican government, 42 for the division of power between the legislature and the judiciary in the area of criminal law is indispensable to democratic governance. 43 Moreover, a judge's ability to cumulate punishments for overlapping offenses represents "[b]y its nature ... an arbitrary power." 44 While guidelines afford judges latitude to determine individual sentences, the number of statutes violated by a single act of the defendant simply "is not relevant" to that determination. 45 Finally, the Multiple Punishment Doctrine provides a measure of finality for the criminal defendant. The prohibition on multiple punishments minimizes the defendant's "anxiety and insecurity" 46 regarding the sentencing process. 47 Once a defendant has "fully suffered ...
[the] punishment[] to which alone the law subjected him," 48 the imposition of further sanctions offends universal notions of fairness. 49 The legislature before multiple punishment will be allowed. Multiple Punishment Doctrine guarantees a defendant that satisfaction of the legislatively authorized sentence will terminate the punishment imposed by society. In Ball v. United States, 50 the Court recognized the potential for "adverse collateral consequences" 51 when a defendant is convicted of multiple, overlapping offenses. Criminal convictions are often used to deny parole, to impeach a witness' testimony, and to enhance sentences under recidivist statutes. Convictions for lesser-included offenses may therefore result in adverse consequences in subsequent criminal proceedings. Ball construed the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to limit the legal effects of a single act in future legal proceedings, reinforcing finality in the criminal justice system.
The Supreme Court has identified four adverse consequences that might fl.ow from the retention of unconstitutional convictions upon a defendant's record: the social stigma resulting from a felony conviction, ineligibility for parole, impeachment of character in future legal proceedings, and increased sentences under recidivist statutes. 52 The effect of additional convictions on a person's reputation cannot be quantified, yet the Constitution creates a presumption that the incremental degradation associated with each conviction constitutes punishment. 53 This consequence alone might justify the conclusion that the retention of conspiracy convictions in addition to a CCE conviction is constitutionally suspect. The reduced possibility for parole, however, is irrelevant in this context because the CCE statute forbids the suspension of a sentence imposed for the offense. 54 Three adverse consequences may fl.ow from allowing convictions for conspiracy to coexist with a CCE conviction. First, the multiplication of convictions increases the defendant's susceptibility to impeachment in subsequent legal proceedings. Evidence of prior felony convictions is admissible to impeach a witness at trial. 55 1984) . The federal rule does contain a potential safeguard against the utilization of convictions for conspiracy, however. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the prosecution to offer proof of past convictions provided that "the court determines that the probative value of admitting [the] evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant." FED. R. Evm. 609(a). This requirement, however, hardly inspires enough confidence to enable one to presume that there is no danger of collateral punishment.
[Vol. 91 :2220 of convictions for both the greater and lesser offenses increases the chance that an adverse party can successfully impeach the credibility of the former prisoner, as the sheer number of convictions may unduly influence a jury. "Although [the defendant] could explain that [the] convictions arose out of the same transaction, a jury might not be able to appreciate this subtlety." 56 The credibility of a previously convicted felon might then play a pivotal role in deciding that person's fate in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 57 The potential sentencing of a defendant as a recidivist presents additional adverse collateral consequences in the CCE context. Although the federal sentencing guidelines count only those convictions arising from separate transactions in calculating a defendant's criminal history score, 58 58. U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 4Al.2 application note 3 (1990) ("Cases are considered related if they (1) occurred on a single occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) were consolidated for trial or sentencing."). The Sentencing Manual does invite judges to depart from the guidelines in the event that the exclusion of related convictions "underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and the danger that he presents to the public." Id.
Hence, the possibility exists that the retention of lesser-included offenses will generate adverse collateral consequences in the Federal penal system. 59. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1975) (distinguishing between two and three prior convictions); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55. 125 (1962 125 ( & Supp. 1992 The government may use multiple convictions for the same conduct to justify the lengthy incarceration of a defendant awaiting trial, a situation implicating "the individual's strong interest in liberty." 65 Hence, the retention of convictions for conspiracy, obtained simultaneously with a CCE conviction, potentially implicates the finality interest safeguarded by the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 66 The Multiple Punishment Doctrine affords criminal defendants protection against prosecutorial overreaching, undergirds the separation of legislative and judicial power, and promotes finality in criminal punishment. While it is easy to identify the protection offered by the doctrine, the procedure for evaluating cumulative punishment claims is not. The next section analyzes the Supreme Court's multiple punishment jurisprudence to isolate the test for scrutinizing complaints of excessive punishment.
B. Analyzing Multiple Punishment Claims
Although one commentator describes double jeopardy doctrine as a "Gordian knot," 67 a careful reading of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the multiple punishment bar reveals a vague but useful strand of analysis for evaluating double punishment claims. court facing an excessive punishment claim must initially decide whether the crimes constitute identical offenses. If the offenses overlap for double jeopardy purposes, courts may still impose punishment on each count if the legislature has authorized them to do so. Absent a clear expression of the legislature's will, the Constitution requires the court to vacate convictions for lesser-included offenses to avoid cumulative punishment. 69 The Supreme Court announced the first step in conducting a multiple punishment analysis -discerning whether two crimes constitute the "same offense" -in Blockburger v. United States. 70 In deciding whether statutory offenses overlap, "the test to be applied ... is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." 71 Courts functionally conduct the analysis in terms of greater and lesser offenses. For example, the Court has noted that in order to convict a defendant of auto theft, a state must establish the lesser offense of joyriding, because all the elements of joyriding are also elements oftheft. 72 In such a situation, "[t]he greater offense is therefore by definition the 'same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it." 73 No multiple punishment occurs if a court finds that two offenses are distinct.
A conclusion that two charges overlap and therefore place a defendant in jeopardy of being convicted for a greater and lesser offense, however, does not end the inquiry. If "Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution." 74 The rule of statutory construction outlined in Blockburger does not control when the legislature reveals its intent to punish cumulatively. 75 (1982) (if "a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment ... a court's task of statutory construction is at an end"); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340. Some commentators criticize the Court's willingness to defer to the legislative branch. They argue that the Court has undermined the substantive protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by defining its scope in terms of legislative formality. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 370-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If the Double Jeopardy Clause imposed no restrictions on a legislature's power to authorize multiple punishment, there would be no limit to the number of convictions a State could obtain on the basis of the same act .... "); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 333 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("No matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that the other did not .
•.
• ");Westen & Drube!, supra note 39, at 113 (the view "that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no restrictions whatsoever on the legislature's definition of offenses ... contradicts a handful of decisions"); Doss, supra note 37, at 1421 ("[T)he multiple punishment bar would be rendered meaningless by a reading that it protects only against the imposition of sentences in excess of legislated limits.").
[Vol. 91 :2220 "cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized." 76 If the relevant legislative history reveals an intent to authorize punishment under two overlapping statutes, a court should defer to the legislative will and impose a sentence for each violation. 1 1 If, however, an analysis of legislative intent fails to yield a definitive result, a court should vacate the convictions on the lesser counts to avoid adverse collateral consequences and the prospect of multiple punishment. 7 s
The Supreme Court has formulated, albeit not explicitly acknowledged, this two-step inquiry for cumulative punishment claims. As the next section demonstrates, the Court has largely followed this jurisprudence in cumulative punishment cases challenging convictions and sentences under the CCE statute.
C. Supreme Court Treatment of CCE and Double Jeopardy
The Supreme Court has examined the interaction between the continuing criminal enterprise statute and the Double Jeopardy Clause on two occasions. In Jeffers v. United States, 19 the Court questioned whether the government may punish an individual for both CCE and conspiracy to violate narcotics laws under 21 U.S.C. § 846. 80 The government initially indicted Garland Jeffers for conspiring to distribute cocaine and heroin, and it later indicted him for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. 81 Jeffers resisted the government's motion to consolidate the two trials, arguing that the proceedings would prejudice him since the indictments involved different groups of codefendants. 82 The district court denied the government's motion and conducted separate trials. 83 Jeffers was found guilty at both trials. Jeffers appealed, claiming that his conspiracy conviction precluded a subsequent conviction for CCE. Jeffers predicated his argument on the notion that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE. 84 The Court held that the subsequent prosecution did not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause because Jeffers had prevented a consolidated . 2233 trial, thereby "waiving" his right to challenge the proceedings. 85 The Court then evaluated Jeffers' claim that his sentences for the CCE conviction and the conspiracy convictions violated the multiple punishment bar. The Court assumed that conspiracy to distribute narcotics is a lesser-included offense within CCE, 86 as CCE requires proof of "concert[ ed]" action between five or more individuals. 87 The Jeffers Court did not hold that CCE and conspiracy are overlapping offenses, however. 88 The Court instead turned to the legislative history of the CCE statute, finding no conclusive evidence that Congress intended to inflict cumulative punishment. 89 Its inquiry complete, 90 the Court concluded that Jeffers had indeed suffered double punishment because the lower court has fined him in excess of the statutory limit for CCE convictions. 91 However, the Court expressly declined to decide whether the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy violated the multiple punishment bar because Jeffers' life sentence without possibility for parole negated any possible adverse collateral consequences. 92 The Court returned to analyze the relationship between CCE and double jeopardy in Garrett v. United States. 93 Garrett pled guilty to one count of importation of marijuana in the Western District of Washington. 94 The Supreme Court has recently questioned the wisdom of applying the traditional lesserincluded offense analysis in "conspiracy prosecutions involv [ing] ... allegations of multilayered conduct as to time and place." United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1385 (1992) (prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine following prior conviction for actual manufacture of the drug). Nonetheless, this Note analyzes CCE and conspiracy under the traditional lesser-included analysis. Initially, the Court has followed the traditional lesser-included analysis when analyzing the two crimes. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150-51 (discussing lesser-included offense analysis in a CCE and conspiracy prosecution); Garrett, 471 U.S. at 794 (affirming in dicta the notion that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE). Second, the Felix Court's mode of analysis is inapposite to the multiple punishment inquiry in this Note. Felix did not involve the CCE statute. Moreover, Felix raised a subsequent prosecution claim rather than a multiple punishment claim. See 112 S. Ct. at 1380. The Court's holding in Jeffers, later upheld in Garrett, that Congress did not intend to punish CCE and conspiracy cumulatively, is intact.
Finally, while conspiracy and a substantive crime are generally separate offenses, conspiracy usually is a lesser-included offense of a crime involving concerted criminal activity. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 (1975) . This notion has been termed "Wharton's Rule." In Iannelli, the Court discussed the operation of Wharton's Rule:
Wharton's Rule applies only to offenses that require concerted criminal activity, a plurality of criminal agents. In such cases, a closer relationship exists between the conspiracy and the substantive offense because both require collective criminal activity. The substantive offense therefore presents some of the same threats that the law of conspiracy normally is structure, and legislative history of [the Act] show in the plainest way that Congress intended the CCE provision to be a separate criminal offense which [is] punishable in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the predicate offenses." 100 The Court issued a limited holding compatible with Jeffers -that Congress had authorized cumulative punishment for "substantive predicate offenses." 101 But the Court's conclusion that substantive predicate offenses are not lesser-included offenses within CCE undermined Jeffers. The Jeffers Court's assumption that conspiracy constitutes an offense included within CCE remained intact, however, because the Garrett majority recognized that Jeffers "reasonably concluded that the dangers posed by a conspiracy and a CCE were similar and thus there would be little purpose in cumulating the penalties."102 The Supreme Court's decisions regarding double jeopardy and CCE have not provided lower federal courts with clear guidance to resolve multiple punishment claims. Under Garrett, the government can punish defendants cumulatively for CCE and substantive narcotics offenses -that is, the actual importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances. The Court has not resolved other multiple punishment issues, however. For instance, the Jeffers Court declined to decide whether conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE. While Garrett followed in dicta the Jeffers Court's assumption that CCE encompasses conspiracy, the issue remains open. Moreover, Jeffers raised other issues. The Court only reduced Jeffers' fine and did not touch his concurrent prison sentences. The Court also declined to discuss Jeffers' simultaneous convictions, although Ball, decided eight years later, appears to require the vacation of lesser-included convictions. Lower courts must decide whether this portion of Jeffers is still viable after Ball. The next Part examines the results of several years of struggle among the federal courts to answer these questions. Not surprisingly, the circuit courts of appeals have generated varying responses to excessive punishment claims advanced by defendants convicted of both conspiracy and CCE.
thought to guard against, and it cannot automatically be assumed that the Legislature intended the conspiracy and the substantive offense to remain as discrete crimes upon consummation of the latter. (1985) . Though this language replicates the phrasing used by those circuits adhering to the "combination approach," the Eleventh Circuit has not referred to the possibility that the conspiracy convictions might be resurrected to justify a defendant's incarceration upon reversal of a CCE count. The courts are apparently referring to the presumption -labeled Wharton's Rule -that a conspiracy offense merges with the substantive offense for sentencing purposes when the conspiracy is a lesser-included offense. argued, 116 Jeffers allowed the imposition of concurrent sentences so long as the cumulative punishment did not exceed the statutory maximum.117 Because Jeffers had been sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the Court let stand his concurrent sentence for conspiracy. 118 At best, these circuits' failure to evaluate multiple punishment claims in a more detailed fashion undercuts the logical force of the decisions because ref'erence to the values underlying a legal rule is often crucial in judicial decisionmaking. 11 9 Worse, the reasoning utilized by these courts may w'eaken the credibility of the majority approach, as evinced by the difficulty which subsequent courts have faced in justifying precedent when confronted with the government's advocacy of one of the minority views. 120 The remaining circuits adhering to the majority rule -the First, 121 In Cloutier, the district court seemingly adopted the Second Circuit's combination approach at the urging of the government. See Cloutier, 966 F.2d at 27 ("The [district] court agreed with the government and merged the conspiracy and CCE sentences into one, so that there were two convictions and one sentence for the two counts."). The circuit court avoided the question "of whether the [district] court erred in merging the conspiracy and CCE counts,'' leaving that issue "for another day." 966 F.2d at 30-31. sion in Ball v. United States 124 for the conclusion that concurrent lesser-included convictions violate the multiple punishment bar. 125 These circuits combine the implication of Jeffers -that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE -with the holding in Ball that convictions for lesser-included offenses entail adverse collateral consequences offensive to the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 126 These circuits recognize that lesser-included conspiracy convictions result in double punishment because they may enhance subsequent sentences under recidivist statutes or be used to impeach trial testimony.w While other courts have questioned the doctrinal merit of the vacation approach, 128 the majority rule circuits resting on both Jeffers and Ball have successfully defended their analysis against the minority views.
B. Minority Approaches
Four circuits have concluded that relevant precedent does not require the elimination of convictions or sentences for conspiracy when a defendant faces punishment for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. The Second and Ninth Circuits adhere to the view· that "combining" conspiracy and CCE convictions into one conviction mitigates any cumulative punishment concerns. The Third Circuit argues that retaining convictions for both CCE and conspiracy, while vacating conspiracy sentences, is consistent with the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. Finally, the Seventh Circuit perceives the additional punishment imposed by the retention of concurrent sentences to be consistent with that authorized by the Court and Congress.
The Combination Approach
The Second Circuit has proposed a unique alternative to the majority rule. Rather than vacating a defendant's conspiracy convic- [Vol. 91:2220 tions, the Second Circuit advocates "combining" those charges with the CCE count so that only one conviction remains. 129 If an appellate court then reverses a defendant's continuing criminal enterprise conviction, the court will automatically reinstate the conspiracy convictions so that the defendant will not elude punishment.13o
Although some circuits reject the Second Circuit's rule, 131 the Ninth Circuit recently has adopted the "combination approach." 132 The Ninth Circuit had been the most haphazard jurisdiction in this area, having implici~ly reversed its stance twice. The Ninth Circuit initially viewed only conspiracy sentences imposed consecutively to a CCE sentence as offensive to the prohibition against cumulative punishment.133 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ball, however, another panel in the circuit concluded that even concurrent sentences "constitute[] cumulative punishment." 134 A few years later another panel again altered the circuit's doctrinal approach to the multiple punishment problem. In United States v. Medina, 135 the court noted that the majority rule places district courts "in a bind"13 6 because it requires a sentencing judge to vacate otherwise valid convictions despite the potential reversal of the CCE conviction. 137 The court concluded that authorizing district court judges to sentence in the alternative presents a "more efficient course." 138 Hence, if an appellate court reverses the CCE charge, "the conviction and sentence on the lesser-included counts will be effective and subject to the same appeal," avoiding "needless remand. without officially recognizing the alliance. 14 1 Courts advocating the "combination approach" have identified three reasons for doing so. First, the merging of separate convictions into a single count averts adverse collateral consequences from the conspiracy charges.· As only one conviction remains following the merger, the conspiracy convictions will not harm a defendant in a collateral manner. 142 Additionally, "the reactivation of the lesser conviction facilitates the congressional'purpose of ensuring that a defendant is punished for whatever degree of a crime he is adjudged to be guilty of having committed." 143 Finally, as Medina recognized, merging the conspiracy and CCE convictions reduces a potential burden on judicial resources. The "combination approach" eliminates the need to remand a case for vacation of the conspiracy convictions, because when the CCE count is affirmed, "the vacation will have been accomplished automatically."144
Permitting Simultaneous Convictions
The Third Circuit allows the retention of both CCE and conspiracy convictions while requiring the vacation of sentences received for the lesser-included conspiracy charges. In United States v. Grayson F.2d at 1253 (majority rule leaves courts "powerless to reinstate the potentially valid lesserincluded counts of conviction"). The Aiello court concluded that there is "no practical difference between [Ball's] prescription to vacate a conviction and our practice of 'combining' a lesser conviction into a conviction on the greater offense." 771 F.2d at 634 n.6. The Fuentes court weighed the relative interests involved, concluding that "[a]ny inherent punitive effect flowing from the continuing existence of the merged lesser-included offense conviction ... is outweighed by the interest in ensuring that those convicted of serious crimes do not unjustifiably escape punishment." 729 F. Supp. at 493.
144. 940 F.2d at 1253. For a full critique of this argument, see infra section 111.C. At a minimum, in the event that an appellate court reverses a CCE conviction, a remand will be necessary to determine the defendant's sentence for conspiracy. The defendant will not have been sentenced for the resuscitated conviction, a condition necessary to justify the continued incarceration of the defendant. For example, appellate courts exercising the inherent power to impose a conviction for a lesser-included offense when reversing a conviction for a greater offense must remand the case for sentencing. The Third Circuit has offered two justifications for retaining conspiracy convictions when a defendant is also convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. First, the Third Circuit divines congressional intent "that predicate conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise convictions may stand," 151 thereby justifying any collateral consequences generated by the retention of separate convictions. 152 Moreover, the Third Circuit argues that simultaneous convictions serve society's interest in ensuring that the guilty do not escape punishment, because upon reversal of the CCE count the government can rely upon the conspiracy convictions to justify a defendant's incarceration. 153
Allowing Convictions and Concurrent Sentences
The Seventh Circuit has held that not only is retention of separate convictions for conspiracy permissible, but imposing sentences for those offenses is also constitutional so long as the cumulative punish- 151. 916 F.2d at 128. The Fernandez court also opined that any collateral consequences flowing from the conspiracy convictions would not be "additional punishment" since the "same consequences" would naturally result from the initial CCE conviction. 916 To summarize, the circuit courts of appeals have announced four differing interpretations of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on multiple punishment in the realm of CCE and conspiracy: vacating conspiracy convictions, combining conspiracy convictions with the CCE conviction, permitting simultaneous convictions without sentences, and allowing both simultaneous convictions and concurrent sentences. Each approach claims the support of Supreme Court precedent. The analysis in the next Part, however, concludes that only the majority vacation approach comports with the Court's pronouncements in Jeffers and Garrett and also eliminates the potential for multiple punishment through adverse collateral consequences.
III . .APPLYING THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT FRAMEWORK TO THE CIRCUITS' APPROACHES
This Part scrutinizes the interaction between continuing criminal enterprise and conspiracy, utilizing the test for Multiple Punishment Doctrine violations outlined in Part I. Section III.A analyzes the two crimes from the standpoint of established cumulative punishment jurisprudence and argues that the minority approaches that impose concurrent convictions or sentences for the two offenses stray from Supreme Court precedent. Section III.B more specifically examines the approaches generated by the Third and Seventh Circuits and rejects them as being inconsistent with the multiple punishment bar. Section IIl.C compares the vacation approach with the combination method and argues that the vacation approach alone is consistent with the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. This Part concludes that the vacation approach advocated by a majority of the courts of appeals best addresses the issue of cumulative punishment.
A. CCE and Conspiracy Under the Two-Step Inquiry
Part I outlined the Supreme Court's two-step analysis of cumulative punishment claims. 163 In order to establish a Multiple Punish-161. 847 F.2d at 1238. 162. 847 F.2d at 1238-39. The Seventh Circuit approach appears to avoid some of the difficulty inherent in the "combination" approach in this respect. An appellate court reversing a CCE conviction will not need to remand the case to the trial court to impose sentence on the remaining conspiracy counts if concurrent sentences are imposed. See supra note 144.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 67-78.
ment Doctrine violation, a defendant must prove that the two offenses are "the same" -that is, that one offense is necessarily included within the definition of the other -and that Congress has not clearly authorized punishment for the two offenses. This Note posits that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE; thus, the offenses are "the same" for the purposes of multiple punishment inspection. 164 The first step in the multiple punishment inquiry is to examine the nexus between the CCE and·conspiracy statutes to determine whether the offenses are the same under the Blockburger test. 165 The two crimes clearly overlap under the test. Initially, the statutes describe identical offenses. By satisfying the requirements of the CCE statute, the government will necessarily prove that a defendant conspired to violate narcotics laws. The CCE statute directs the prosecutor to establish that a defendant has committed a series of violations of the narcotics laws 166 "in concert with five or more other persons." 167 Proof that a defendant acted in concert with at least five other individuals in the course of his criminal activities will involve evidence of at least one conspiracy. 168 In order to demonstrate that a defendant has conspired to violate the narcotics laws, a prosecutor therefore need not offer any proof independent of that required by the CCE statute.
Moreover, courts uniformly agree that conspiracy is indeed a lesser-included offense within the CCE statute. The Court in Jeffers, while not prepared to declare definitively the two offenses to be the same for double jeopardy purposes, 169 did note that "the phrase 'in concert' . . . has generally connoted cooperative action and agree-164. As previously noted, the Supreme Court has repudiated somewhat the lesser-included offense test in the context of complex prosecutions involving "multilayered conduct." United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1385 (1992); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 789 (1985) . In Felix. however, the Court merely reaffirmed the general rule (noted in Garrett) that "conspiracy to commit an offense and the offense itself . . . are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes." 112 S. Ct. at 1385. This type of analysis is inappropriate when conspiracy is an element of a "substantive" offense. Wharton's Rule creates "an exception to the general principle that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes for which separate sanctions may be imposed." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 771 (1975) . See supra note 99.
165. This Note analyzes the CCE and conspiracy offenses under the Blockburger rule rather than relying on the assumption in Jeffers that the crimes are identical, as some majority-rule jurisdictions have done. See supra text accompanying notes 109-20.
166. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988). 167. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (1988). 168. The government may choose to rely on substantive offenses (that is, actual importation and distribution) rather than conspkacy to establish the "series of violations" required by 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2). The prosecutorial strategy in such an instance will not obviate the need for proof of conspiracy, however. The government would have to establish that the substantive predicate offenses were masterminded by the defendant in coordination with at least five persons, which necessarily involves evidence of conspiratorial conduct. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 148 (1977) ("Even if § 848 were read to require individual agreements between the leader of the enterprise and each of the other five necessary participants, enough would be shown to prove a conspiracy.").
169. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 153 n.20.
[Vol. 91:2220 ment." 170 The Court would probably be unwilling to renounce the assumption given that its interpretation in Jeffers comports with the generally accepted meaning of the term. Indeed, the Court's subsequent admonition in Garrett that the "dangers posed by a conspiracy and CCE [are] similar" 171 confirms the view that courts should regard conspiracy as a lesser-included offense of CCE. Finally, the circuit courts of appeals unanimously view conspiracy and CCE as lesser and greater offenses. 112
The second step in a multiple punishment inquiry -inspecting legislative intent for authority to cumulate punishments -compels the conclusion that Congress intended to punish either CCE or conspiracy but not both. A survey of the structure and history of the continuing criminal enterprise statute does not indicate that Congress has "clear[ly]" 173 and "specially"1 74 condoned punishment for conspiring to violate narcotics laws and engaging in a CCE. The CCE statute "reflects a comprehensive penalty structure that leaves little opportunity for pyramiding of penalties. 180. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156-57 ("The policy reasons usually offered to justify separate punishment of conspiracies and underlying substantive offenses, however, are inapplicable to sional intent in light of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, which operates as a presumption in favor of lenity, forbidding cumulative punishment unless clearly authorized by the legislature. 181 The evidence regarding legislative authorization to cumulate the penalties for CCE and conspiracy is, at best, "inconclusive." 182 Indeed, no court has marshalled evidence of congressional intent to allow cumulative punishment.1 83 The above traditional, lesser-included analysis compels the conclusion that the government may not punish CCE and conspiracy cumulatively. However, courts should look to the underlying protections afforded a criminal defendant by the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to complete the multiple punishment inquiry. 184 Whether the protections are undermined essentially depends on the existence of adverse collateral consequences, which affect the criminal defendant's interest in finality. 185 The other interests served by the doctrine -protecting against prosecutorial overreaching and preserving the separation of powers -rest on the assumption that a defendant's sentence exceeds that authorized by the legislature. In the CCE and conspiracy context, the question of cumulative punishment 186 turns on whether collateral consequences will flow from retaining convictions for the lesserincluded offense when a court convicts and sentences for operating a continuing criminal enterprise. See infra text accompanying notes 207-13. 187. A defendant in the position to challenge conspiracy convictions because of the potential for collateral consequences will inevitably encounter identical consequences from a CCE conviction. The fact that such negative consequences are "not unique" to the criminal defendant convicted of both CCE and conspiracy was proffered by the Third Circuit in Fernandez as a reason for concluding that preserving conspiracy convictions does not entail multiple punishment.
[ Vol. 91:2220 The retention of both conspiracy and CCE convictions generates four adverse collateral consequences in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. A defendant convicted both of conspiracy and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise faces additional social stigma from each conspiracy conviction. 188 Second, the lesser-included conspiracy convictions heighten the possibility that a person convicted for CCE will be impeached in a future legal proceeding. 18 9 A jury might not comprehend the significance of the fact that several convictions stem from the same set of events. 1 9° Thus, lesser-included conspiracy convictions might provide the basis for impeachment, which could be critical for a defendant in a future proceeding. Third, the retention of lesser-included conspiracy convictions may subject defendants to recidivist sentencing statutes that enhance punishment based solely on the number of convictions on their records. 1 9 1 For instance, a defendant might be convicted for operating a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiracy to import narcotics, and conspiracy to distribute narcotics.
Though part of one coherent scheme, these convictions would qualify the defendant as a habitual felon in several states. 192 Finally, the retention of lesser-included conspiracy convictions increases the risk that a defendant will endure pretrial detention pursuant to a subsequent arrest. 193 These consequences, however remote, exceed the punishment authorized by Congress. 1 9 4
These adverse collateral consequences also undermine other interests that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine safeguards. 195 A vindictive prosecutor could easily discriminate between criminal defendants by charging certain defendants with multiple conspiracies, arbitrarily exposing them to the prospect of punishment greater than other, similarly situated defendants. 196 Permitting a defendant to be convicted, sentenced, or both for conspiracy in addition to CCE penetrates the constitutional barrier erected between the legislative and judicial branches of government. Absent specific authorization from the legislature to cumulate punishments, allowing convictions for lesser offenses to stand goes beyond the scope of judicial power because those convictions invariably constitute punishment in excess of the legislatively enacted statutory scheme. 198 Thus, the Supreme Court's test for evaluating multiple punishment claims and the constitutional values underlying the prohibition on cumulative punishment both suggest that conviction and sentencing for conspiracy in addition to CCE is inconsistent with the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. The next section examines the constitutionality of permitting a defendant convicted and sentenced for engaging in a CCE to be concurrently sentenced for conspiring to violate the narcotics laws.
B. Unconstitutionality of Retaining Concurrent Convictions or

Sentences: The Third and Seventh Circuit Approaches
The conclusion that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine forbids cumulative sentencing for CCE and conspiracy implies that the Third and Seventh Circuits' approaches undermine the prohibition on multiple punishments. Thus, the reasons offered by the Third Circuit for retaining conspiracy convictions, while vacating sentences received for those counts, merit consideration. 1 99 The Third Circuit, in United States v. Fernandez, justified the retention of conspiracy convictions by arguing that " [t] here is simply no indication ... that Congress did not intend to permit separate convictions to stand for the conspiracy and notoriety and those who have offended the police are frequently selected for multiple punishment.") (footnotes omitted).
197. See supra text accompanying note 33. A prosecutor may apply these incentives most effectively against persons entering the criminal justice system for the first time and facing both CCE and conspiracy charges. If the conspiracy charges do not count against the defendant, the person can rationally weigh the chances of conviction against the known consequences of conviction, since the range of punishment would be confined to the CCE statute. However, a defendant facing unknown criminal sanctions from multiple conspiracy convictions might find the incentive to waive the exercise of his or her constitutional rights irresistible. 199. But cf. Yanik, supra note 11, at 519 (praising Third Circuit for "enunciat[ing] the rule that if there exists one general sentence, the length of which is limited by the statutory maximum allowable under the more serious offense, then there is no perversion of the double jeopardy concept").
[Vol. 91:2220 continuing criminal enterprise offenses." 200 This conclusion both perverts the government's constitutionally mandated burden to establish congressional authorization to cumulate punishments and ignores Jeffers' reading of the CCE statutory scheme. Established precedent requires evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to punish cumulatively; 201 Jeffers explicitly concluded that Congress has not expressed the requisite intent in this arena. 202 Moreover, attempts to justify the retention of conspiracy convictions as a device for the continued incarceration of CCE offenders in the event of appellate reversal of CCE convictions 203 do not alter the constitutional equation. Although the Court has recognized a state's interest in ensuring punishment of criminals for their offenses, 204 it has refused to "weigh" the values derived from the Double Jeopardy Clause. " [W] here the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds that are not open to judicial examination. "205 The Third Circuit's approach should not be condoned given the risk of excessive punishment inherent in the retention of separate convictions for the two offenses. 2 06
The conclusion that retaining conspiracy convictions in addition to a CCE conviction violates the Multiple Punishment Doctrine also renders the Seventh Circuit's approach -permitting both simultaneous convictions and concurrent sentences -constitutionally suspect. The Seventh Circuit aggravates the constitutional violation by permitting the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy convictions. In United States v. Bond, 201 the court justified concurrent sentences by arguing that "Jeffers does not govern [as long as] the total punishment imposed by the district court is less than the maximum allowed by the CCE Act." 208 Under this reasoning, no multiple punishment problem occurs if the sentencing court imposes concurrent sentences on the conspiracy counts for periods shorter than the sentence imposed for CCE. The Jeffers Court did not approve concurrent sentences but simply declined to address the issue as not ripe for adjudication. 209 The Jeffers Court simply did not address the issue of concurrent sentences because the defendant was sentenced to life in prison without parole. 210 Instead, Jeffers presumed that conspiracy falls within the statutory definition of a CCE. 211 The extensive discussion of adverse collateral consequences in Ball v. United States 212 eclipses the weak support that the Seventh Circuit's position purports to derive from Jeffers. 213 The Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the Multiple Punishment Doctrine mandate dismissing the Third and Seventh Circuit approaches. The combination approach and the majority vacation approach require greater scrutiny, however, as they appear facially to avoid constitutional infirmity. 
C. Comparison of the Combination and Majority Approaches
Advocates argue that both the vacation and combination methods avoid adverse collateral consequences. 214 The vacation approach ensures that courts will never use conspiracy convictions as the basis for future sanctions against a defendant because the convictions disappear from the defendant's record. The combination approach arguably achieves the same result by merging the two convictions into one, while retaining the capacity to revive the conspiracy conviction upon reversal of the CCE conviction.21s
Two courts have explicitly rejected the combination approach, justifying their decisions on the basis that the potential for collateral consequences remains. 216 Neither court, however, addressed the reasons underlying their conclusion. 217 Careful consideration reveals two ways in which the combination approach may infringe on the protections guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Initially, the combination approach cannot guarantee that no adverse collateral consequences will follow from the merger of the convictions because the presence of the conspiracy convictions on a defendant's record invites their use against the defendant in a later sentencing or at a future trial. Conspiracy convictions are not "merged out of existence" 218 under the combination approach; less sophisticated jurisdictions may misperceive a defendant's record and count the conspiracy and CCE convictions independently in calculating a recidivist sentence. Thus, despite protestations to the contrary, 2 19 a defendant in a combination 214 Moreover, the combination approach entails the risk that a trial court will improperly consider the defendant's conspiracy convictions in the sentencing process. This risk takes three forms. First, a trial court may improperly calculate a defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines by assuming that the conspiracy convictions justify additional punishment and impose additional sentencing points upon a defendant for his or her "role in the offense." 224 The additional points for conspiracy punish excessively because the penalty for concerted action is already reflected in the CCE sentence.22s Additionally, a trial judge may -consciously or unconsciously -rely on conspiracy convictions in establishing the defendant's base offense level. 226 The sen- acy convictions] is especially indicated here, where the trial judge's reliance in sentencing on the lesser conspiracy count allowed a three to four level increase that is prohibited for the greater CCE count."). The guidelines generally allow for a four-level increase in the base olfense level "[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants." U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 3Bl.l(a). Such conduct is part of the statutocy definition of a CCE, so a "role in the olfense" increase is prohibited for conspiratorial conduct in a continuing criminal enterprise.
225. tence then reflects an aggregation of convictions impermissible under the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. Finally, a trial court might rely on a defendant's conspiracy conviction in setting the defendant's sentence within the range permissible under the sentencing guidelines. 227 While the Sentencing Commission has set rigid schedules for determining sentences, the trial judge retains discretion to fix a defendant's sentence within the range prescribed by the guidelines. 228 The combination approach thus generates the risk that the sentencing judge will impose a sentence toward the upper end of the range because of the conspiracy convictions. The risk of these sentencing errors arises because the combination approach implicitly regards conspiracy convictions as conduct independently warranting punishment. 229 Even assuming that the combination method effectively eliminates the possibility for adverse collateral consequences, the approach fails on policy grounds. Proponents have marshaled two policy arguments in favor of merging conspiracy convictions into the CCE conviction. Initially, the Second Circuit maintains that combining the convictions ensures that a defendant does not escape punishment in the event that his CCE conviction is overturned on appeal. 230 In other words, the conspiracy convictions should be retained -albeit denied effect -as a basis for continued incarceration to further both penological objectives and public safety.
The continued incarceration argument is unpersuasive, however. State and federal appellate courts have long enjoyed the power to impose a conviction for a lesser-included offense upon reversal of a greater offense. 23 1 Courts justify this power, the constitutionality of which "has never seriously been questioned," 232 on two grounds. First, courts possess the power under the common law to direct that a conviction for the lesser offense be entered since "[a] jury's finding of guilt on all elements of the greater offense is necessarily a finding of guilt on all elements of the lesser offense." 233 Moreover, the federal judiciary can invoke the appellate courts' statutory authority to "modify . . . any judgment . . . and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment ... as may be just under the circumstances. " 234 The combination approach, therefore, offers no advantage over the majority approach in this regard. 235 Both methods guarantee the continued incarceration of potentially dangerous felons.
In addition, the Second Circuit's fear that persons convicted of engaging in a criminal enterprise will escape punishment absent the combination approach is unjustified. First, if an appellate court reverses a CCE conviction because of evidentiary insufficiency, the inadequate proof will likely impugn a defendant's conspiracy convictions as well because conspiracy is an element of CCE. 236 The same logic applies to reversals for constitutional error -conspiracy and CCE convictions are often obtained pursuant to identical enforcement practices, 237 so both convictions are likely to suffer from the same constitutional infirmity. 238 If the error does not infect the evidence of a conspiracy, the government is free to prosecute the defendant for that crime without [Vol. 91:2220 offending the Double Jeopardy Clause.239
The Ninth Circuit suggests a second policy advantage for the combination approach -the conservation of scarce judicial resources. The Ninth Circuit reasons that the combination method avoids the need to remand a case to vacate conspiracy convictions because, upon affirmance of the CCE conviction, "the vacation will have been accomplished automatically." 240 But this argument's appeal fades upon inspection. Initially, the majority approach also avoids unnecessary remands because the trial court must vacate the conspiracy convictions at sentencing. 241 Additionally, a CCE conviction will never be "affirmed" in the sense contemplated by the Ninth Circuit. A conviction is normally subject to habeas corpus review, 242 so the conspiracy convictions must remain in effect until the defendant completes the maximum possible sentence for conspiracy if the combination method is to achieve the desired result. Thus, conspiracy convictions will never be vacated "automatically"; they must be vacated by the trial court in order to be purged from a defendant's record. 243 The majority approach better avoids taxing judicial resources. · Under the combination approach, a defendant can initially appeal only the conviction and sentence for the CCE count because "the judgment on the lesser-included offense is not final until sentencing. " 244 The combination approach then permits the conspiracy conviction to be chose to do so, any conviction on the greater would again replace the conviction on the lesser .... "). . A judgment must include both the verdict and a sentence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(l) ("A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence.") (emphasis added); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) ("After imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of the defend· ant's right to appeal ..•. ") (emphasis added). Thus, a defendant cannot appeal a "combined" conspiracy conviction until sentence has been imposed, which necessitates two sets of appeals in a combination approach jurisdiction.
revived if the appellate court reverses the CCE conviction. The case would be remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the defendant's conspiracy counts. 245 Only after sentencing could the defendant appeal the conspiracy conviction.246 Thus, "[t]he minority position may result in two appeals from the same trial." 247 The majority approach avoids this possibility because the appellate court will necessarily review the propriety of the conspiracy conviction when deciding to exercise the authority to impose convictions for the lesser-included offenses. 248 The compatibility of the majority rule with traditional excessive punishment doctrine provides a compelling argument in its favor. Since the CCE statute requires proof of conspiratorial conduct, 249 and Congress has not explicitly authorized cumulative punishment, 250 courts should vacate conspiracy convictions. 251 The vacation approach also realizes the values underlying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. For example, the majority rule eliminates the possibility of adverse consequences flowing from separate convictions for CCE and conspiracy, a critical factor in the Supreme Court's multiple punishment analysis. 252 A defendant faces no danger of future collateral consequences under the majority approach, which purges the invalid convictions from the defendant's record. 253 
CONCLUSION
The Double Jeopardy Clause is among the most powerful and important aspects of the Bill of Rights. The Multiple Punishment Doctrine, derived from the Clause, is designed to further several goals, including limiting the potential for prosecutorial abuse, preserving the separation of powers, and preserving a criminal defendant's interest in finality. Permitting courts to impose conspiracy convictions for behavior identical to that deemed necessary by Congress to establish the separate offense of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise poses a unique challenge to the prohibition on cumulative punishment. Retaining conspiracy convictions imposes excessive punishment on the criminal defendant because such convictions risk consequences ad- [Vol. 91:2220 verse to the defendant beyond those intended by Congress. Eliminating conspiracy convictions from a defendant's criminal record is the only constitutionally sufficient response to the multiple punishment problem in the continuing criminal enterprise context.
The majority approach, mandating the vacation of lesser-included conspiracy convictions when a court simultaneously convicts a defendant of operating a continuing criminal enterprise, best addresses the risk of cumulative punishment through adverse collateral consequences. Even assuming that the combination method could avoid collateral consequences, the policy advantages proffered by the circuits adhering to the combination approach do not justify experimentation given the Supreme Court's clear expression in Ball v. United States of the constitutional need to vacate lesser-included convictions. Indeed, the vacation approach also prevails on policy grounds. The majority approach permits the judiciary to ensure that defendants will remain incarcerated if the court reverses their CCE conviction, and the vacation of convictions best conserves scarce judicial resources by avoiding two sets of appeals from the same trial.
